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Abstract
This Essay examines aspects of the free movement of workers and the issues concerning the
content and impact of the introduction of citizenship of the European Union (”EU” or “Union”).
This Essay draws from seven years of opinions from Advocate General Slynn, which were written
during a highly formative period in the development of Community law. Defining who is a worker
and examining the benefits of having and retaining this worker status remain as important today as
they were in the late 1980s, when relevant seminal case law of the Court of Justice was established.
In many of those cases, Gordon Slynn was the Advocate General. The advent of formal recognition
of Union citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht has not obviated the need to consider the range of
rights which flow from such citizenship when an individual is in a Member State other than that of
his nationality. These rights still, though to a lesser extent than before, turn on economic activity,
or a close link to economic activity. That makes citizenship of the Union, at least to some extent,
an incomplete form of citizenship.
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REVISITING FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS 
Robin C. A. White 
INTRODUCTION 
Gordon Slynn was Advocate General at the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities (“Court” or “ECJ”) from 1981 to 
1988 and a judge at the Court from 1988 to 1992. The single 
collegiate judgments of the Court of Justice1 mean that we have 
to discern judicial attitudes and approaches, as far as we can, 
from extra-judicial writings. But advocates general speak for 
themselves, and we have seven years of opinions from Advocate 
General Slynn during a highly formative period in the 
development of Community law on which to draw.2 
To a certain extent, some aspects of the free movement of 
workers now play second fiddle to issues concerning the content 
and impact of the introduction of citizenship of the European 
Union (“Union” or “Community”).3 Nevertheless, a sharp 
distinction is still drawn between those who are economically 
active and those who are not. The former are citizens of the 
Union with the strongest transnational rights, while the latter, 
when they move from the Member State of their nationality to 
 
* Professor of Law, and member of the Centre for European Law and Integration, 
in the School of Law, The University of Leicester. The author holds a part-time judicial 
appointment as a Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal; in so far as any comments 
overlap with his judicial function, the views expressed are purely personal. 
1. See MARGARET HORSPOOL & MATTHEW HUMPHREYS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 103 
(2006). 
2. Of particular relevance to this Article are the opinions in the following cases: 
Belgium v. Humbel, Case 263/86, [1988] E.C.R. 5365; Brown v. Sec’y of State for 
Scotland, Case 197/86, [1988] E.C.R. 3205; Lair v. Universität Hannover, Case 197/86, 
[1988] E.C.R. 3161; Blaizot v. Univ. of Liège, Case 24/86, [1988] E.C.R. 379; Barra v. 
Belgium & City of Liège, Case 309/85, [1988] E.C.R. 355; Commission v. Belgium, Case 
293/85, [1988] E.C.R. 305; Kempf v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 139/85, [1986] 
E.C.R. 1741; Gravier v. City of Liège, Case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R. 593; Morson & Jhanjan 
v. The Netherlands, Joined Cases 35–36/82, [1982] E.C.R. 3723; and Levin v. 
Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 53/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1035. 
3. Since December 1, 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the term 
“European Community” has been replaced with the term “European Union.” However, 
this Essay uses both “Community” and “Union” to refer to what is now the European 
Union. 
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another Member State, can be seen as potential burdens on 
public funds and as unwelcome intruders. For these reasons, 
defining who is a worker and examining the benefits of having 
and retaining this worker status remain as important today as 
they were in the late 1980s, when some seminal case law of the 
Court of Justice was established. In many of those cases, Gordon 
Slynn was the Advocate General. 
The advent of formal recognition of Union citizenship in 
the Treaty of Maastricht4 has not obviated the need to consider 
the range of rights which flow from such citizenship when an 
individual is in a Member State other than that of his nationality. 
These rights still, though to a lesser extent than before, turn on 
economic activity, or a close link to economic activity. That 
makes citizenship of the Union, at least to some extent, an 
incomplete form of citizenship. 
I. DEFINING WHO IS A WORKER 
In one of its early decisions, the Hoekstra case,5 the ECJ ruled 
that the definition of “worker” was not dependent on any 
national classification of workers and self-employed people, but 
was a Community law concept. It also recognized that persons 
could retain their status as workers though not actually 
employed, as, for example, when they were ill, or had retired 
from employment.6 Levin7 gave further substance to the 
definition of worker. In Levin, Gordon Slynn was Advocate 
General. The case concerned a British national living in the 
Netherlands with her South African husband.8 She had worked 
 
4. Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191/1. 
5. See Hoekstra v. Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en Ambachten, 
Case 75/63, [1964] E.C.R. 177. 
6. The latter point was explicitly covered by article 48(3)(d) of the EEC Treaty. See 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 48(3)(d), at 72, Mar. 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. Subsequently it was covered by article 
39(3)(d) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
art. 39(3)(d), 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 29 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Now, following the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, it is covered by article 45(3)(d) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union art. 45(3)(d), 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 51 
[hereinafter TFEU]. 
7. Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 53/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1035. 
8. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Levin, [1982] E.C.R. 1035, 1055. 
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regularly as a chambermaid in various hotels in Amsterdam, and 
was refused a residence permit, for which Community law 
provided.9 When she asked for the decision to be reconsidered, 
she was working part-time as a chambermaid for around twenty 
hours a week.10 Reconsideration, however, did not result in the 
granting of a permit. Advocate General Slynn was of the opinion 
that, under articles 2 and 3 of the European Economic 
Community Treaty (“EEC Treaty”),11 a person must be engaged 
in “an activity of an economic nature” to be considered a 
worker.12 There was nothing in the scheme of the EEC Treaty 
which required the interpretation of worker to be restricted to a 
person who earns a particular wage or works for a certain 
number of hours per week. Nor is the presence or lack of private 
means to supplement the earnings to a certain level a relevant 
issue. For Advocate General Slynn, however, the person must be 
moving to another Member State for the purpose of the 
employment, though there is no requirement to show that that 
purpose is the dominant purpose.13 The Advocate General 
proposed that the Court answer the referred questions in the 
following terms: 
A national of one Member State who, on the territory of 
another Member State undertakes paid work under a 
contract of employment, qualifies as a “worker” within the 
meaning of Article 48 of the EEC Treaty and its 
implementing legislation, and is entitled accordingly to be 
issued with a residence permit of the kind mentioned in 
Article 4 of Council Directive 68/360 even though such 
employment is so limited in extent as to yield an income 
lower than that which is regarded in that State as the 
minimum necessary to enable the costs of subsistence to be 
met . . . . 
. . . . 
 
9. At the time, Council Directive 68/360 required “abolition of restrictions on the 
movement and residence of nationals in Member States and their families . . . .” Id. at 
1057 (referring to Council Directive No. 68/360, art. 4, 1968 O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed., at 
485). 
10. Id. at 1055. 
11. Id. at 1058. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 1060–61. 
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The right of such a national to admission into and residence 
in the Member State pursuant to Article 48 and its 
implementing legislation is dependent on its being shown 
that the work in the Member State is a genuine and 
substantial purpose of such national although it need not be 
the chief purpose.14 
The ECJ ruled that one’s motivation for moving was only 
relevant insofar as the person was moving to pursue “an effective 
and genuine activity” as an employed person.15 The Court also 
ruled that “the exceptions to effective and genuine activities were 
those ‘activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely 
marginal and ancillary.’”16 This requirement might be regarded 
as a sufficiency test regarding the nature of the work being 
undertaken. 
The ECJ then added a formal test to the sufficiency test in 
the Lawrie-Blum case.17 To determine that a person is employed 
for the purposes of what is now article 45 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), the Court must 
answer three questions affirmatively: 
1. Is the person obliged to work for another? 
2. Is the work done for monetary reward or payment in 
kind? 
3. Is the person subject to the direction and control of 
another?18 
The broad scope of the test established in the Levin case 
resulted in a later reference in the Kempf case.19 In Levin, the 
plaintiff had argued that the couple had private means which 
enabled them to meet their living expenses.20 In Kempf, the 
question was whether a person would be a worker under 
Community law if his or her earnings, which were below 
subsistence level, needed to be supplemented by public 
assistance.21 Again, Gordon Slynn was the Advocate General. He 
 
14. Id. at 1061–62. 
15. Levin, [1982] E.C.R. 1035, ¶¶ 21–22. 
16. Id. ¶ 17. 
17. Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case 66/85, [1986] E.C.R. 2121. 
18. Id. ¶ 13. The exchange of work for payment in kind was established in 
Steymann v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 196/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6159. 
19. Kempf v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 139/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1741. 
20. See Levin, [1982] E.C.R. 1035. 
21. See Kempf, [1986] E.C.R. 1741. 
  
1568 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1564 
had no doubt that there should be no restriction imposed on 
acquiring worker status under the EEC Treaty by the mere fact 
that the person was dependent upon a financial supplement 
from social security benefits to reach what the Member State 
regarded as a subsistence income.22 He did, however, concede 
that recourse to public funds could be taken into account in 
determining whether the work being undertaken was “purely 
marginal and ancillary” rather than “genuine and effective” 
work.23 The Court in Kempf followed the opinion of the Advocate 
General.24 
The decisions in the Levin and Kempf cases remain key 
authorities on the definition of who is a worker under what is 
now article 45 TFEU.25 In the Kempf case, the Court said: 
The Court has consistently held that freedom of movement 
for workers forms one of the foundations of the Community. 
The provisions laying down that fundamental freedom and, 
more particularly, the terms ‘worker’ and ‘activity as an 
employed person’ defining the sphere of application of 
those freedoms must be given a broad interpretation in that 
regard, whereas exceptions to and derogations from the 
principle of freedom of movement for workers must be 
interpreted strictly.26 
Similar statements and references to the Levin case can be found 
in more modern authorities.27 
II. BENEFITS OF WORKER STATUS 
The benefits of establishing worker status under article 45 
TFEU28 are manifold. They include: freedom from immigration 
control, considerable protection against deportation, a right to 
remain in the Member State of residence upon finishing work 
 
22. See id. at 1744. 
23. Id. 
24. See Kempf, [1986] E.C.R. at 1747, ¶ 16. 
25. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 45, 2008 O.J. C 115/47; see, e.g., Petersen v. 
Arbeitsmarktservice Niederösterrreich, Case C-228/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-6989; Ninni-
Orasche v. Bundesminister für Wissenschaft, Verkehr & Kunst, Case C-413/01, [2003] 
E.C.R. I-13,187; and Raulin v. Neth. Ministry of Educ. & Sci., Case C-357/89, [1992] 
E.C.R. I-1027. 
26. Kempf, [1986] E.C.R. 1741, ¶ 13. 
27. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 25. 
28. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 45, 2008 O.J. C 115/47. 
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either as a result of retirement or disablement, entitlement to 
equality of treatment with nationals of the Member State of 
residence, equal entitlement with nationals to social and tax 
advantages widely interpreted, rights to bring other members of 
your family to join you, and a right to reasoned decisions 
affecting any of these listed rights.29 
Some of the enumerated rights are more generous than 
those accorded to workers within the Member State of residence. 
This gave rise to claims that if Community law provided such 
rights, then national law should be obliged to grant similar rights 
to nationals of that Member State who had not exercised their 
rights to move to another Member State under Community law. 
Once again the Advocate General in one of the seminal cases was 
Gordon Slynn.30 The Morson case31 concerned the claims of the 
mothers of two Dutch nationals of Surinamese origin, who were 
living and working in the Netherlands to secure resident permits. 
The mothers did not have Dutch nationality. Morson and 
Jhanjan applied for residence permits under the Community law 
provisions as the mothers of workers of Dutch nationality in 
order to enable them to stay in the Netherlands following a visit 
to see their children.32 The Dutch immigration authorities took 
the view that Community law did not apply, since the Dutch 
nationals had never exercised their rights to move and work in 
another Member State.33 The provisions of the relevant 
secondary legislation were, it was argued, for the benefit of those 
exercising their rights of free movement, and were designed to 
avoid obstacles to such movement.34 The problem arose because 
the provisions of the Community law rules were more generous 
 
29. For an elaboration of these rights, see ROBIN C.A. WHITE, WORKERS, 
ESTABLISHMENT AND SERVICES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 138–88 (2004). See also Council 
Regulation on Freedom of Movement for Workers Within the Community, No. 1612/68, 
1968 O.J. L 257/2, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968, at 475; Council Directive on the Rights of 
Citizens of the Union and Their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely Within the 
Territory of the Member States, No. 2004/38, 2004 O.J. L 158/77, corrected version in 
2004 O.J. L 229/35, corrected by 2005 O.J. L 197/34, corrected by 2007 O.J. L 204/28 
[hereinafter Citizenship Directive] (subsequent citations will be to the full text English 
version at 2004 O.J. L 229/35, unless otherwise noted). 
30. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Morson v. The Netherlands, Joined Cases 
35–36/82, [1982] E.C.R. 3723, 3742. 
31. Morson, [1982] E.C.R. 3723. 
32. Id. ¶ 2. 
33. See id. ¶ 18. 
34. See id. ¶ 15. 
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than the national immigration rules on bringing parents from 
other countries to join their children as their dependants. The 
Advocate General noted that there was nothing to prevent 
individuals pleading rights arising under Community law against 
the Member State of which they are a national, but the claims 
must be ones arising because Community law is engaged. Here, 
that was not the case. He concluded: 
In the present case there is no suggestion or indication that 
the workers in question have ever exercised or sought or 
intended to assert their rights under the Treaty. They have 
not been employed in another Member State. Accordingly it 
seems to me that their relatives cannot say that they have any 
rights under Community law to install themselves with their 
children.35 
The ECJ came to the same conclusion in its judgment, 
though it drafted its ruling in slightly different terms.36 The line 
of cases in which the ECJ has ruled that a Member State is free to 
treat its own nationals less favorably than is required by 
Community law to treat similarly situated nationals of other 
Member States has been labeled “reverse discrimination” cases.37 
It applies where a matter is wholly internal to a Member State. 
The Court of Justice has, however, not needed much persuading 
to determine that a situation is one in which there is a factor 
linking a person with a situation governed by Community law.38 
The issue of reverse discrimination will be further discussed in 
Part IV.B. 
Retaining worker status after having been employed carries 
a passport to equal treatment with nationals in relation to a 
whole raft of potential benefits. One battleground has been 
entitlement to financial support to meet living expenses as a 
student. Gordon Slynn was Advocate General in the Gravier 
case,39 which established that Community competence in this 
area was limited. There was a common approach to vocational 
training, and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality contained in article 7 of the EEC Treaty meant that 
 
35. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Morson, [1982] E.C.R. 3723, 3742. 
36. See Morson, [1982] E.C.R. 3723, ¶ 10. 
37. Id. ¶¶ 12–15. 
38. For a detailed discussion of the question of reverse discrimination, see ALINA 
TRYFONIDOU, REVERSE DISCRIMINATION IN EC LAW (2009). 
39. Gravier v. City of Liège, Case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R. 593. 
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tuition fees charged to students pursuing vocational training 
must be the same for nationals of all the Member States.40 It was 
subsequently established in Humbel41 that a course year of 
secondary education could be part of vocational training if it 
could be said to be part of an overall body of instruction leading 
to qualification for a particular profession, trade, or employment, 
but that state-provided education was not a service within what 
was then article 49 of the EEC Treaty.42 
A series of cases in 1988, in which the Advocate General was 
Gordon Slynn, took up the issue of access to financial support for 
studies as an entitlement arising under Community law. The 
starting point was the judgment in Gravier, which meant that 
those arguing for a Community law entitlement to financial 
support for their studies could not simply rely on the prohibition 
of discrimination in matters within the scope of the EEC Treaty 
as the basis for their claim. The Gravier case had established that 
equality of access to vocational training required equal treatment 
of all nationals of the Member States only in relation to tuition 
fees; any system of educational grants fell outside the scope of 
Community law per se.43 In both Lair44 and Brown,45 the 
individuals were arguing that they were workers who had ceased 
work in order to undertake vocational training. In such 
circumstances, they argued, they continued to qualify as workers 
under the EEC Treaty and were entitled to financial support for 
their studies since this was a benefit falling within article 7 of 
Regulation 1612/68.46  
 
40. See EEC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 7; see also Barra v. Belgium & City of Liège, 
Case 309/85, [1988] E.C.R. 355; Blaizot v. Univ. of Liège, Case 24/86, [1988] E.C.R. 379 
(elaborating on the concept of vocational training); Commission v. Belgium, Case 
293/85, [1988] E.C.R. 305 (disagreeing with Advocate General Slynn on the 
admissibility of an enforcement action against Belgium concerning tuition fees). 
41. Belgium v. Humbel, Case 263/86, [1988] E.C.R. 5365. The Advocate General in 
this case was again Gordon Slynn. 
42. See id. ¶¶ 13, 20; see also EEC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 49, at 56 (subsequently 
article 9 EC, and now article 56 TFEU). 
43. Gravier, [1985] E.C.R. 593, ¶ 26. This remained the case until the judgment in 
The Queen, ex rel. Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing, Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-
2119. 
44. Lair v. Universität Hannover, Case 39/86, [1988] E.C.R. 3161. 
45. Brown v. Sec’y of State for Scot., Case 197/86, [1988] E.C.R. 3205. 
46. See Brown, [1988] E.C.R. 3205, ¶¶ 3–5; Lair, [1988] E.C.R. 3161, ¶ 2; see also 
Council Regulation No. 1612/68, supra note 29, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968, at 475. 
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The situations of the two claimants, however, were different. 
Sylvie Lair was a French national who had been living in 
Germany since at least the start of 1979.47 She had been 
employed there for two-and-a-half years, but thereafter had a 
sporadic record of employment, unemployment, and retraining. 
In 1984 she started a degree course in Romance and Germanic 
languages and literature at the University of Hanover.48 She 
applied for an educational grant, which the university refused to 
award on the grounds that, as a non-German national, she had 
not been engaged in full-time employment in Germany for at 
least five years.49 The Advocate General concluded that the facts 
before him indicated that Sylvie Lair was someone who had gone 
to and was in Germany as a “genuine worker economically 
integrated into the host State.”50 The crucial question was 
whether she had ceased to be a worker for the purposes of 
Community law when she started her university course. Advocate 
General Slynn interpreted article 7(3) of Regulation 1612/68 to 
mean that a person who ceases work and undertakes what the 
provision described as “training in vocational training schools 
and retaining centres” did not thereby lose their worker status.51 
But article 7(2) is also relevant in providing for equal access to 
“social and tax advantages.”52 The Advocate General reached an 
important conclusion: 
The question is thus whether the training sought here is in a 
vocational training school. I have come to the conclusion 
that “vocational training” can take place in a university. . . . If 
that is right a university in my view is pro tanto a vocational 
training school and I see no valid reason to apply Article 
7(3) to only some institutions of education where vocational 
training is given. There is no magic in the word “school”: 
within a university the word is not uncommonly found as 
being a part of the university as in “law school” or “medical 
school.”53 
 
47. See Lair, [1988] E.C.R. 3161, ¶ 3. 
48. See id. 
49. See id. ¶ 6. 
50. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Lair, [1988] E.C.R. 3161, 3184. 
51. See id. 
52. Council Regulation No. 1612/68, supra note 29, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968, at 
475. 
53. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Lair, [1988] E.C.R. 3161, 3186. 
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Consequently, he was able to conclude: 
A national of one Member State who moves to another 
Member State and takes up employment in the capacity of a 
worker is entitled to an award of an educational grant for 
maintenance subject to the same criteria and on the same 
terms as national workers: (a) in respect of general 
education as a social advantage under Article 7(2) of 
Regulation No 1612/68; (b) in respect of training in 
vocational schools under Article 7(3) of that regulation.54 
The ECJ largely followed this reasoning in concluding that 
(a) an educational grant to enable a person to pursue university 
studies leading to a professional qualification is a social 
advantage within article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68; (b) a 
person who has been a worker who undertakes university studies 
leading to a professional qualification is to be regarded as 
retaining worker status and is entitled to equal treatment with 
nationals in access to such educational grants, provided that 
there is a link between the previous occupational activity and the 
studies in question; and (c) a Member State cannot make access 
to benefits falling within article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68 
conditional upon a minimum period of prior occupational 
activity on the territory of that Member State.55 
Stephen Brown’s circumstances were somewhat different. 
He had a French mother and a British father, and held both 
French and British nationalities.56 In 1965, the family moved to 
France, where Stephen had been educated. In 1983, he secured a 
place at the University of Cambridge to study electrical 
engineering on a degree course starting in the autumn of 1984.57 
Stephen worked in employment described as “pre-university 
industrial training,” which included a twelve week inductory 
course followed by work as an employee of the participating 
firm.58 Stephen’s participation in this scheme was patently a 
success, since he was awarded a sponsorship by the employer. 
This entitled him to a sum of money each term, as well as paid 
employment in university vacations to increase his industrial 
 
54. Id. at 3189. 
55. See Lair, [1988] E.C.R. 3161, ¶¶ 24–44. 
56. Brown v. Sec’y of State for Scot., Case 197/86, [1988] E.C.R. 3205, ¶ 3. 
57. Id. 
58. Id.; see also Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Brown, [1988] E.C.R. 3205. 
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experience. The University of Cambridge did not require its 
incoming students to have undertaken industrial experience 
prior to the start of the course, but there was a required eight 
week industrial placement which formed part of the course at the 
end of the second year of studies.59 Stephen applied for an 
educational grant to the Scottish Education Department, which 
refused to award the grant because Stephen did not meet the 
conditions of entitlement. First, he had not been ordinarily 
resident in the British Isles for three years ending on August 31, 
1984.60 Second, although he had been resident in another 
Member State for the requisite period, he could not meet both of 
the following conditions: (a) he had not been employed in 
Scotland for nine of the twelve months prior to August 31, 1984, 
and (b) he was not seeking the educational grant in respect of a 
course at a vocational training establishment.61 There was a 
further condition that, in such cases, the applicant must have 
entered the United Kingdom wholly or mainly for the purpose of 
taking up or seeking employment. Third, although he had been 
resident in another Member State and was the child of nationals 
of a Member State, neither of his parents was employed in 
Scotland on the qualifying date, in this case June 30, 1984, nor 
had they been employed in Scotland for an aggregate period of 
one year in the three years prior to June 30, 1984.62 Brown 
challenged the refusal to award an educational grant.63 
In response to questions raised by the Scottish court, the 
Advocate General first concluded that the Cambridge degree 
program constituted vocational training under Community law in 
that it formed an integral part of the overall training required for 
recognition as a chartered engineer.64 The core question was 
whether the industrial experience Brown had undertaken, which 
took the form of employment prior to his studies, enabled him to 
secure access to an educational grant as a worker. The Advocate 
General identified the central question as: 
In my opinion for the purposes of applying for a student 
grant under Article 7 [of Regulation 1612/68] he must show 
 
59. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Brown, [1988] E.C.R. 3205. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Brown, [1988] E.C.R. 3205, ¶ 2 
64. Id. 
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that he does so genuinely in his capacity as a worker and he 
must be in the Member State in such capacity and for the 
purpose of being a worker.65 
The Advocate General then gave a strong steer to the national 
court by noting that a person undertaking employment linked to 
industrial experience, primarily to better prepare themselves for 
a degree program, is not someone whose presence in the host 
Member State is for the primary purpose of employment. The 
work is “ancillary to the course of study.”66 Once again the ECJ 
largely followed the opinion of its Advocate General. 
A common thread which runs through the opinions of 
Advocate General Slynn in the cases considered in this Article is 
the purpose of the activities undertaken by the person seeking to 
rely upon Community law to secure some entitlement arising 
under Community law. This enabled him to draw a distinction in 
drafting his opinions in Lair and Brown. Sylvie Lair had achieved 
economic integration into the host Member State through her 
pattern of employment, whereas Stephen Brown had not. He was 
simply preparing himself effectively for a Cambridge degree 
program. The distinction can be a narrow one; one might say 
that Sylvie Lair was an economic mover, whereas Stephen Brown 
was a student mover. As we shall see, such distinctions continue 
to hold significance in an era in which the umbrella of 
citizenship of the Union covers all nationals of the Member 
States. However, amendments to the EEC Treaty coupled with 
the advent of citizenship have produced a situation in which the 
ECJ, in its 2005 Bidar case, ruled that financial support for studies 
did now fall within the scope of the EC Treaty.67 
III. THE ADVENT OF CITIZENSHIP 
Articles 8 to 8c of the EEC Treaty as amended by the Treaty 
of Maastricht contained provisions formally establishing 
citizenship of the Union.68 Prior to this, many scholars argued for 
 
65. Id. at 3232. 
66. Id. 
67. Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing, Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-2119, ¶ 31. 
For a discussion of the case, see Oxana Golynker, Student Loans: The European Concept of 
Social Justice According to Bidar, 31 EUR. L. REV. 390 (2006). 
68. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community arts. 
8–8c, 1992 O.J. C 224/1, at 11. 
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the need for a model of citizenship to make the benefits for 
individuals of participation in the European integration project 
more apparent.69 The provisions inserted by the Treaty of 
Maastricht subsequently became articles 17 to 22 of the EC 
Treaty,70 and are now articles 20 to 25 of the TFEU.71 
One of the most significant cases in recent years on the free 
movement of persons is the Baumbast case.72 The case concerned 
two families, but exposition of the circumstances of one of them 
is sufficient for understanding how the ECJ developed its case 
law. Mr. Baumbast was a German national, and his wife was a 
Colombian national. They had two daughters.73 Mr. Baumbast 
had been a worker employed in the United Kingdom.74 He 
followed this employment with a period of self-employment, and 
held a five-year residence permit under the Community 
secondary legislation in operation at the time. When his self-
employment came to an end, he obtained employment with a 
German company, but his work was abroad in China and 
Lesotho. The family continued to live in the United Kingdom, 
where his daughters went to school. The family had never 
claimed any social security benefits in the United Kingdom, and 
had comprehensive medical insurance in Germany, where they 
travelled from time to time for medical treatment.75 The 
Secretary of State refused to renew Mr. Baumbast’s residence 
permit on the grounds that he was no longer a worker, and 
refused the applications of his wife and children for indefinite 
leave to remain in the United Kingdom.76 Mr. Baumbast 
challenged the decisions, and questions were referred to the 
ECJ.77 The Court used the concepts of citizenship of the Union 
and the rights set out in article 18 of the EC Treaty (now TFEU 
 
69. See SIOFRA O’LEARY, THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY CITIZENSHIP, 
FROM THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS TO UNION CITIZENSHIP 3–31 (1996); see also 
MASSIMO CONDINANZI ET AL., CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNION AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 
OF PERSONS 1 (2008); Francis Jacobs, Citizenship of the European Union—A Legal Analysis, 
13 EUR. L.J. 591 (2007). 
70. EC Treaty, supra note 6, arts. 17–22, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 49–51. 
71. TFEU, supra note 6, arts. 20–25, 2008 O.J. C. 115, at 56–58. 
72. Baumbast v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Case C-413/99, [2002] E.C.R. I-
7091. 
73. Id. ¶ 16. 
74. Id. ¶ 18. 
75. Id. ¶ 19. 
76. Id. ¶ 20. 
77. Id. ¶¶ 21–22. 
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article 21) to fill gaps in the treaty rules and provisions in the 
secondary legislation of the right to free movement. 78 The Court 
said: 
A citizen of the European Union who no longer enjoys a 
right of residence as a migrant worker in the host Member 
State can, as a citizen of the Union, enjoy there a right of 
residence by direct application of Article 18(1) EC. The 
exercise of that right is subject to the limitations and 
conditions referred to in that provision, but the competent 
authorities and, where necessary, the national courts must 
ensure that those limitations and conditions are applied in 
compliance with the general principles of Community law 
and, in particular, the principle of proportionality.79 
The ECJ has increasingly given a constitutional significance 
to the economic, political, social, and other rights contained in 
the treaty provisions on citizenship. The current mantra of the 
ECJ is as follows: 
[I]n accordance with settled case-law, citizenship of the 
Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals 
of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in 
the same situation to receive the same treatment in law 
irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as 
are expressly provided for . . . .80 
Article 18 of the EC Treaty (now TFEU article 21) states the right 
“to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this 
Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect.”81 Article 22 
 
78. See id. ¶¶ 92–94. 
79. Id. ¶ 94. The constitutional significance of the requirement to test national 
conditions against the requirement of proportionality is explored in Michael Dougan, 
The Constitutional Dimension to the Case Law on Union Citizenship, 31 EUR. L. REV. 613 
(2006). 
80. Gottwald v. Bezirkshauptmannschaft Bregenz, Case C-103/08, [2009] E.C.R. __, 
[2010] C.M.L.R. 25, ¶ 23. See also Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing & Sec’y of State for 
Educ. & Skills, Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-2119, ¶ 31; Schempp v. Finanzamt 
München V, Case C-403/03, [2005] E.C.R. 6421, ¶ 15; Orfanopoulos & Oliveri v. Land 
Baden-Württemberg, Joined Cases C-482/01 & C-493/01, [2004] E.C.R. I-5257, ¶ 65; 
Garcia Avello v. Belgium, Case C-148/02, [2003] E.C.R. 11613, ¶ 22; and Grzelcyk v. 
Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, Case C-184/99, [2001] E.C.R. 
I-6193, ¶ 31. 
81. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 21, 2008 O.J. C. 115, at 57; EC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 
18, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 49. The qualifying words ensure that the rights of free 
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TFEU grants extended political rights to stand for and vote in 
municipal elections in the Member State of residence, and in 
elections to the European Parliament.82 Article 23 TFEU pools 
the resources of the Member States to enable diplomatic and 
consular protection to be afforded by the representation of any 
Member State where the Member State of the person’s 
nationality has no diplomatic or consular representation in the 
country concerned.83 Article 24 TFEU extends the complaint 
mechanisms available to citizens of the Union in relation to 
matters falling within the scope of the Union treaties.84 
The advent of citizenship of the Union coupled with 
developments in the case law of the Court of Justice resulted in 
the recasting of a whole raft of secondary legislation concerning 
the free movement of persons into a single directive.85 The 
Citizenship Directive is at one level a consolidating measure, but 
is arguably much more than that in its tone and in some of its 
provisions, such as the introduction of a new right of permanent 
residence. The Citizenship Directive repeals and re-enacts the 
provisions of nine directives and amends Regulation 1612/68.86 
The existing piecemeal approach to the regulation of rights of 
entry and residence has been recast in a single instrument. In 
addition, the European Commission (“Commission”) has 
repealed a Commission regulation. The debate is whether the 
measure goes beyond consolidation and the introduction of the 
new right of permanent residence. It can certainly be regarded as 
presenting the rights of free movement which attach to 
citizenship of the Union in a more obviously constitutional 
framework than the secondary legislation it replaces. When the 
Citizenship Directive is read with the provisions on citizenship 
introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht, and with Regulation 
1612/68 and Regulation 1408/71 on the coordination of social 
 
movement are not an addition to the rights to be found elsewhere in the treaty and in 
secondary legislation of the Community. 
82. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 22, 2008 O.J. C. 115, at 57. 
83. Id. art. 23, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 58. 
84. Id. art. 24, 2008 O.J. C. 115, at 58. 
85. Citizenship Directive, No. 2004/38, 2004 O.J. L 229/35. 
86. Id. art. 38, 2004 O.J. L 229, at 48. 
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security schemes,87 there is a comprehensive set of rights 
attaching to citizenship of the Union. 
Under the Citizenship Directive, rights of movement are set 
out, which vary dependent upon the activities and degree of 
integration of the citizen;88 there is a reduction on the 
bureaucracy surrounding movement;89 there is a new right of 
permanent residence which arises after a continuous period of 
residence lasting five years in whatever capacity in another 
Member State;90 there are tighter controls on the powers to 
deport a national of another Member State;91 and there are 
clearer rights to equality of treatment.92 
Not everything is as clear as it should be, however. A report 
in December 2008 by the Commission to the European 
Parliament and Council indicated that no Member State had 
fully transposed the requirements of the directive, and that there 
was no single provision of the directive which had been fully 
implemented in all the Member States.93 Some of this would 
seem to be the result of ambiguities in the drafting of the 
directive, and some the result of a lack of full social solidarity 
among the Member States in securing in national law the rights 
set out in the directive. In some cases, it would seem that 
Member States have simply viewed the Citizenship Directive as an 
immigration measure, when it clearly goes beyond that. The 
complexity of transposing the requirements of the Citizenship 
Directive into the national legal orders of the Member States can 
 
87. Council Regulation on the Application of Social Security Schemes to Employed 
Persons and to Members of Their Families Moving Within the Community, No. 
1408/71, 1971 O.J. L 149/2, amended by 1997 O.J. L 28/4 (the latest official 
consolidation of its provisions). The regulation has been amended on a number of 
subsequent occasions, and has been replaced by Regulation No. 883/2004, 2004 O.J. L 
166/1, corrected version in O.J. L 200/1 (2004), as amended, with effect from May 1, 
2010. 
88. Citizenship Directive, No. 2004/38, arts. 4–5, 2004 O.J. L 229, at 39. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. arts. 16–21, 2004 O.J. L 229, at 43–45. 
91. Id. arts. 28–33, 2004 O.J. L 229/35, at 46–47. 
92. Id. art. 24, 2004 O.J. L 229/35, at 45. 
93. See Commission of the European Communities, The Application of Directive 
2004/38/EC on the right of Citizens of the Union and Their Family Members to Move 
and Reside Freely within the Territory of the Member States: Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM (2008) 840/3, at 3 
(December 2008); see also SERGIO CARRERA & ANAÏS FAURE ATGER, IMPLEMENTATION OF 
DIRECTIVE 2004/38 IN THE CONTEXT OF EU ENLARGEMENT: A PROLIFERATION OF 
DIFFERENT FORMS OF CITIZENSHIP? 1–5 (2009). 
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be illustrated by developments in the context of entitlement to 
social security benefits in the United Kingdom. For a number of 
income-related benefits, a condition of entitlement is that the 
person claiming the benefit has a “right to reside” in the United 
Kingdom. The term is not defined in the relevant secondary 
legislation in the national legal order, and it is readily conceded 
by the Department for Work and Pensions before those courts 
and tribunals in which the issue arises that the “right to reside” 
may flow from entitlements under European Union law.94 The 
focus is then on the United Kingdom regulations that seek to 
implement the Citizenship Directive, and on the proper 
interpretation of some of the case law of the ECJ. The result has 
been at least five references to the ECJ on the interpretation and 
application of European Union law.95 
There is considerable discussion in the literature on 
whether there has been a move from a “market citizen,” that is, 
one whose rights flow from economic activity, to a “social 
citizen,” whose citizenship is largely independent of engagement 
in a particular activity in order to secure rights.96 Dougan 
observes of the case law developments: 
 
94. See Dep’t of Work & Pensions, Pension Credit, Income Support, Income Based 
Employment and Support Allowance and Income-based Jobseeker's Allowance, 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/international/benefits/pension-credit-income-support (last 
visited June 29, 2010). 
95. See Sec’y of State for Work & Pensions v. Dias, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 807, [2010] 
1 C.M.L.R. 112 (aspects of the interpretation of the Citizenship Directive and its 
relationship with the repealed provisions); Sec’y of State for Work & Pensions v. Lassal, 
[2009] EWCA (Civ) 157 (temporal aspects of acquiring permanent residence under the 
Citizenship Directive); Teixeira v. London Borough of Lambeth, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 
1088, [2009] H.L.R. 127 (the right to reside in order to care for children under the 
Baumbast case); McCarthy v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., [2008] EWCA (Civ) 641 
(reference referred to in the Dias case; the interpretation of the words “resided legally” 
in the Citizenship Directive); London Borough of Harrow v. Ibrahim, [2008] EWCA 
(Civ) 386. The ECJ references are London Borough of Harrow v. Ibrahim, Case C-
310/08 (ECJ Feb. 23, 2010) (not yet reported); Teixeira v. London Borough of 
Lambeth, Case C-480/08 (ECJ Feb. 23, 2010) (not yet reported); Opinion of Advocate 
General Trstenjak, Sec’y of State for Work & Pensions v. Lassal, Case C-162/09 (ECJ, 
delivered May 11, 2010) (Court decision not yet issued); McCarthy v. Sec’y of State for 
the Home Dept., Case C-434/09, (pending case); and Sec’y of State for Work & Pensions 
v. Dias, Case C-325/09 (pending case). 
96. See, e.g., ELSPETH GUILD, LEGAL ELEMENTS OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY: EU 
CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION LAW (2005); JO SHAW, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2007); Samantha Besson & André Utzingerm, 
Introduction: Future Challenges of European Citizenship—Facing a Wide-Open Pandora’s Box, 
13 EUR. L.J. 573, 573–90 (2007); Michael Dougan, The Constitutional Dimension to Case 
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Most commentators seem agreed that the Court has 
embarked on what is (in effect) an exercise in social 
engineering: economically inactive migrant Union citizens 
are entitled to claim membership of the national solidaristic 
community, based on nothing more than the common bond 
of Union citizenship, albeit subject to the idea that such 
individuals cannot become an unreasonable burden upon 
the public purse.97 
Thus, we may conclude that there are two routes to securing 
equality of treatment with nationals of the host Member State 
prior to the acquisition of permanent residence in the host 
Member State. The first route is to establish that the beneficiary 
is economically active, or is deemed to continue to be 
economically active, as, for example, when people move from 
employment to vocational training connected with that 
employment which will enhance their job prospects. In such 
cases, that is enough to entitle the person to the benefits for 
which the Citizenship Directive provides. The alternative route is 
to establish a sufficient degree of social integration in the host 
Member State that, regardless of any link with economic activity, 
the principle of social solidarity requires that person to be 
treated equally with nationals of the host Member State.98 Those 
are two radically different routes to the securing of rights under 
European Union law. 
IV. CONSEQUENTIAL ISSUES 
A. The Continuing Significance of the Free Movement of Workers 
Despite the constituionalizing effect of judgments of the ECJ 
both in relation to rights of free movement flowing from 
 
Law on Union Citizenship, 31 EUR. L. REV. 613, 613–41 (2006); Michelle Everson, The 
Legacy of the Market Citizen, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 73–90 (Jo 
Shaw & Gillian More eds., 1995); Kay Hailbronner, Union Citizenship and Access to Social 
Benefits, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1245, 1245–67 (2005); Christine Jacqueson, Union 
Citizenship and the Court of Justice: Something New Under the Sun? Towards Social Citizenship, 
27 EUR. L. REV. 260, 260–81 (2002). 
97. Dougan, supra note 96, at 622. 
98. For a somewhat pessimistic view of these developments, see generally Michael 
Dougan, The Spatial Restructuring of National Welfare States within the European Union: The 
Contribution of Citizenship and the Relevance of the Treaty of Lisbon, in INTEGRATING 
WELFARE FUNCTIONS INTO EU LAW—FROM ROME TO LISBON 147, 147–87 (Ulla 
Neergaard et al. eds., 2009). 
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economic activity and solely as an incident of citizenship of the 
Union, the freedom from immigration control enjoyed by 
nationals of the Member States is essentially conditional until a 
right of permanent residence is acquired after five years of 
continuous and lawful residence.99 The right to permanent 
residence can, however, be lost as a result of absence from the 
host Member State for a period exceeding two consecutive 
years.100 Under the Citizenship Directive, the right to enter and 
reside has three distinct phases: (a) the initial three months; (b) 
residence for more than three months; and (c) acquisition of a 
right of permanent residence.101 
The right to enter and reside for up to three months is 
unconditional, but during this time, the migrant has very little 
entitlement to assistance from the host Member State. Under 
article 7 of the Citizenship Directive, residence for more than 
three months is conditional on the person establishing that he or 
she is (1) a worker or self-employed person; (2) a person of 
independent means with comprehensive sickness insurance 
coverage in the host Member State; or (3) a student with 
comprehensive sickness insurance coverage in the host Member 
State and a realistic expectation that he or she has sufficient 
resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance 
system of the host Member State.102  
Article 24(1) of the Citizenship Directive contains the 
expression of the principle of equal treatment found in article 18 
TFEU103 by providing that “all Union citizens residing on the 
basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State 
shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member 
State within the scope of the Treaty.”104 However, there is a 
derogation from this requirement in article 24(2) of the 
Citizenship Directive, which provides that the principle of equal 
treatment does not extend to an entitlement to social assistance 
 
99. This exposition focuses on the right of the person moving to enter and reside, 
but there are also extensive rights for family members to accompany the “primary” 
mover. 
100. Citizenship Directive, No. 2004/38, art. 16(4), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 43. 
101. Id. arts. 6–7, 16, 2005 O.J. L 197/34, at 39–40. 
102. Id. art. 7, 2005 O.J. L 197/34, at 40. 
103. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 18, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 56; EC Treaty, supra note 6, 
art. 12, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 43. 
104. Citizenship Directive, No. 2004/38, art. 24(1), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 45. 
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within the first three months of residence, nor to an entitlement 
to financial assistance for studies until a person has acquired 
permanent residence.105 This leaves a lengthy period between the 
three months’ residence and the acquisition of permanent 
residence during which entitlement to equal treatment is 
unclear. Such entitlement would appear to arise only when a 
person’s residence falls within the specific requirements of article 
7 of the Citizenship Directive.106 For those whose residence is 
initially based upon being a worker, this brings sharply into play 
the circumstances in which worker status will be lost, but the 
person wishes to remain resident in the host Member State. 
Article 7(3) of the Citizenship Directive deals with some 
common situations. First, temporary inability to work as a result 
of illness or accident does not result in the loss of worker 
status.107 Second, involuntary unemployment arising after a 
person has been employed for at least a year, where it is “duly 
recorded,” and where the person has registered as a job-seeker 
with an employment office, does not result in the loss of worker 
status.108 Third, worker status is extended for at least six months 
when a person is involuntarily unemployed on the ending of 
fixed-term employment, or during the first twelve months of 
employment. Furthermore, the unemployment must be “duly 
recorded” and the person must be registered as a job-seeker with 
an employment office.109 Finally, worker status is retained where 
the person embarks on vocational training, provided that the 
training is related to the previous employment.110 The proviso 
does not apply if the vocational training follows involuntary 
unemployment;111 presumably, the rationale is that the person is 
training for alternative employment. Difficulties can arise in 
Member States like the United Kingdom where there is no 
obvious procedure directly linked to recording unemployment as 
being involuntary.112 
 
105. Id. art. 24(2), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 45. 
106. Id. art. 7(3)(b), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 39. 
107. Id. art. 7(3)(a), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 40. 
108. Id. art. 7(3)(b), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 40. 
109. Id. art. 7(3)(c), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 40. 
110. Id. art. 7(3)(d), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 40. 
111. Id. 
112. Whether a person is voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed can be an issue 
in relation to the conditions of entitlement to a United Kingdom unemployment 
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All this indicates that worker status is central to a person’s 
right to continue to reside in a Member State other than that of 
his or her own nationality. That, in turn, means that the 
European Union law definitions of employment (and, indeed, 
self-employment) retain a centrality in European Union law 
which casts back to the authorities of the ECJ established when 
Gordon Slynn was Advocate General. There have, of course, been 
glosses and additions to the case law in the period since the late 
1980s, but the foundations had already been laid by then. In all 
the talk of the constitutionalizing effect of the case law that has 
touched on citizenship of the Union, it should not be forgotten 
that the free movement of workers is part of one of the four 
fundamental freedoms113 which form the foundations of the 
internal market at the heart of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union.114 
B. Reverse Discrimination 
Reference has been made earlier in this Essay to the 
principle of “reverse discrimination” under which European 
Union rights do not accrue unless there is some factor linking 
the situation to one contemplated by the Union treaties.115 The 
result has been that, where the matters in dispute arise wholly 
within a particular Member State, no reliance can be placed 
upon European Union rights where they are greater than those 
accorded in the national legal order. Has this principle been 
affected by the introduction of citizenship of the Union? After 
all, if all nationals of the Member States are thereby citizens of 
the Union, why should one not be able to rely upon European 
Union rights merely by virtue of holding that European Union 
citizenship? In the Schempp case, the ECJ provided a simple 
answer to this question: “However, it also follows from the case-
law that citizenship of the Union, established by Article 17 EC, is 
 
benefit, but the issue arises in the context of considering a claim for benefit and not as a 
matter of recording the circumstances in which the person became unemployed. 
113. The four fundamental freedoms are the free movement of goods, persons, 
services, and capital. 
114. See, e.g., Petersen v. Arbeitsmarktservice Niederösterrreich, Case C-228/07, 
[2008] E.C.R. I-6989, ¶¶ 43–51. 
115. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
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not intended to extend the material scope of the Treaty to 
internal situations which have no link with Community law.”116 
So simple a statement disguises the way in which the ECJ 
now determines whether a situation is “wholly internal” to a 
Member State. Schempp concerned a German national who lived 
in Germany.117 He was complaining about the tax treatment of 
maintenance payments that he made to his ex-wife who, at the 
material time, lived in Austria.118 The ECJ concluded that these 
circumstances meant that Schempp’s complaint about the 
German tax treatment of his maintenance payments was not a 
matter wholly internal to Germany. Because his ex-wife had 
exercised her rights to move to another Member State, the 
implications for the tax treatment of maintenance payments was 
enough to extend the matter beyond being purely internal to 
Germany.119 
C. Interdependencies and Inter-Relationships 
The development of rights attaching to citizenship of the 
Union raises questions of the interdependency of national 
citizenship and Union citizenship. While it is logical to suggest 
that citizenship of the Union enables such citizens to take a 
bundle of European Union law rights into Member States of 
which they are not nationals, the treaty basis for citizenship of the 
Union provides for certain restrictions on such rights.120 It 
subjects them to the conditions laid down in the treaty and to 
provisions in the secondary legislation of the European Union. 
Besson and Utzinger pertinently observe: 
This reservation refers in particular to the legitimate interest 
of Member States to require social and financial coverage 
before granting the permission to reside legally, in order to 
 
116. Schempp v. Finanzamt München V, Case C-403/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-3171, ¶ 20 
(citing Land Nordhein-Westfalen v. Uecker, Joined Cases C-64–65/96, [1997] I-3171, ¶ 
23, and Garcia Avello v. Belgium, Case C-148/02, [2003] I-11,613, ¶ 26). 
117. Id. ¶ 7. 
118. Id. ¶¶ 8–10. 
119. Id. ¶¶ 22–25. For examples of cases where the connection to European Union 
law was accepted in the particular factual situations before the Court of Justice, and 
which might not have been so decided prior to the introduction of citizenship of the 
Union, see Zhu v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., Case C-200/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-
9925, and Garcia Avello v. Belgium Case C-148/02, [2003] E.C.R. I-11,613. 
120. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 20, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 57. 
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protect their public resources. By analogy, these inherent 
Treaty-based limitations apply to all other EU citizenship 
rights, which by definition are rights granted by the Treaty 
and hence are limited according to the Treaty. This has, per 
se, always been an object of concern since it subjects EU 
citizenship rights to limitations one may accept in relation to 
fundamental economic freedoms but not pertaining to other 
social and political citizenship rights.121 
There is also an important inter-relationship between 
reliance on economic activity both to move and to secure certain 
rights in the host Member State, and reliance on the citizenship 
route to enter and reside in another Member State. For the 
economically active, there is a presumption that they will not be a 
burden on the host Member State, but in certain circumstances 
that eventually may arise during that grey period between 
residence beyond three months and the acquisition of 
permanent residence. Their economic activity opens up access to 
benefits which are not available for a “citizenship migrant,” 
including access to income-related benefits. It is for this reason 
that the free movement of workers, as part of one of the four 
fundamental freedoms, remains as significant today as it was 
when Gordon Slynn, as Advocate General, suggested solutions to 
the ECJ on basic questions relating to the interpretation of what 
was then article 48 of the EEC Treaty. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the introduction of citizenship of the Union and its 
significant influence on the case law dealing with rights to enter 
and reside in a Member State other than that of a person’s own 
nationality, there still exists a system of rights which is markedly 
hierarchical. European Union migration law, like many national 
migration laws, favors the well-off over those of more limited 
means. However, the ability to move as an economically active 
migrant free from immigration control now offers the 
opportunity to secure permanent residence in another Member 
State with guarantees of equal treatment in every respect with 
nationals of the host Member State. Not requiring a work permit 
or any other form of permission to enter and reside as a worker, 
 
121. Besson & Utzinger, supra note 96, at 587. 
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and to remain as a worker (even when not actually working) 
provides distinct benefits that should not be dismissed. But the 
hierarchical nature of the rights contained in the Citizenship 
Directive makes the definition of who is a worker and when that 
status is retained still of considerable importance in European 
Union law. These issues, from time to time, bring national legal 
orders into conflict with European Union law. The current 
battleground relates to various benefits which would be available 
to nationals in similar situations, but which are denied to 
nationals of other Member States on the grounds that they have 
lost a favored status under the European Union rules, and must 
now fall back on their own resources rather than those of the 
State. This, in turn, suggests that levels of social solidarity among 
the Member States are still relatively undeveloped. Member 
States still tend to see themselves as having a higher responsibility 
to look after their own nationals than nationals of other Member 
States who fall on hard times while resident in the host Member 
State. 
